Remedial Law Case Digest (CRIMPRO):

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY

Principle:

Laches, generally, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Facts:

An action for collection of a sum of money in the sum of P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest was filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio which was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the RA 296 or otherwise known as Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect which deprives the CFI of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c.] and 86[b.], R.A. 296.)

Now, the case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding, the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals’ adverse decision.

Consequently, considering that the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

Issue:

Whether the appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

Ruling:

No. The appellant’s motion to dismiss cannot prosper. The Court discussed the following principles in arriving at its decision.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. As such, it speaks of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, generally, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

“In one case, it has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction”.

“Furthermore, in another case, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. “

“And, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterward deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.”

The above principle is what the Court has said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that the Court frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were the Court to sanction such conduct on its part, it would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this are not only patent but revolting.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.