Remedial Law Case Digest:
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION , petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 164108. May 8, 2009.]
Facts:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate and was survived by his wife, private respondent, and his only daughter. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto. The first Civil case was with the petitioner Hilado and the second one was with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
Later on, RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two civil cases. Thereafter, the RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
Soon after, petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
The RTC and CA denied such manifestation/motion. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that the claims of the petitioner were contingent or expectant, as there were still pending in litigation in a separate proceeding before the other courts.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can intervene in the intestate proceeding of Roberto S. Benedicto
Ruling:
The Court ruled in negatively.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons falls within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”
Hence notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Takeaway: The Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules od Court provides that “in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings”, thus, it is clear that when there are no exact special provisions expressed in the Rules of Court then it cannot be left to unduly serve justice because the rules of ordinary actions are can be applied. Hence, the contingent claim is not included in the expressed definition of intervention under Rule 19.